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Scholars have grown increasingly interested in the association between climate
conditions and social unrest. Though no consensus exists regarding the specific
mechanisms that connect both phenomena, scholars have found a links between rising
temperatures, precipitation, or the magnitude of disasters and social unrest. However, is
unclear to what extent deviations from historical trends rather than absolute levels might
serve as important indicators of unrest. Moreover, it remains unclear how effectively
socio-demographic factors like quality of life and ethno-religious fragmentation can
explain trends on unrest, net of climatological indicators. This project tests the extent to
which deviation from historical trends in precipitation is associated with an increase in
the frequency of protests in India (2016) – net of key indicators of quality of life and
socio-economic fragmentation. District-level analyses employ satellite-based
precipitation data and protest event data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
(ACLED) project, combined with socio-demographic data from the India Census and
related sources. Results indicate that protests levels are associated with climatological
and quality of life or social inequality indicators. Moreover, results generally indicate a
strong relationship between deviation from historically average precipitation and protests.
However, the direction of this association varies cross years. Implications of these results
are discussed as potentially related to increasing climatological instability.
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Introduction
Regional climate conditions are associated with social unrest, particularly in the
context of global climate change (e.g. Kelley et al. 2015; Nardulli et al. 2015; O’Loughlin
et al. 2012 or for a review see Carleton, Hsiang, and Burke 2016). One consequence of
global climate change includes an increasing likelihood that climate will deviate from
historical averages (Rind, Goldberg, and Ruedy 1989). This tendency of the climate to
depart from what is normal historically may itself drive social unrest, particularly protest
events. When measures of precipitation are included in models, they tend to focus on
absolute levels of precipitation rather than relative deviations, the scope is generally
restricted to analysis of rare events such as disasters or the onset of civil conflict, and
these projects have typically examined countries or regions in Africa (e.g. Buhaug 2010;
Buhaug et al. 2015; Burke et al. 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Jones, Mattiacci, and
Braumoeller 2017). Measuring precipitation relative to historical conditions is important
because, for example, an arid region is dry relative to the rest of a nation, and although
one might speculate that this is indicative of a drought and that protests should rise as a
consequence, the people living in this hypothetical arid region are actually well adapted
to the arid climate. If, on the other hand, an arid region experiences an unusually large
amount of precipitation, flooding might occur, which may in turn lead to various forms of
social unrest such as protest. Long term, public support for environmental spending is on
the decline in the United States (Johnson and Schwadel 2019). Therefore, it is important
to understanding the potential consequences of falling investment in the environment,
especially the consequences of global climate change.
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This study extends our understanding of the relationship between climate and
social unrest by examining the relationship between precipitation and protest events in
the politically volatile and climatologically diverse nation of India. Understanding the
relationship between variation in weather (over time and across geographic units) and
protests is important in order to understand the consequences of global climate
variability. Researchers have long studied the consequences of environmental disasters.
However, disaster studies essentially focus on the direct and indirect impact such rare
events have on social instability, including food prices, mass migration/internal
displacement, and ultimately unrest (for a review see Lindell 2013).
In contrast, this study examines whether or not short- and medium effects on
protest are produced by extremes in precipitation in both directions as drought and
flooding may be associated with an increase in social unrest (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel
2013). Examining extreme climate conditions thus enables this study to focus on
relatively common events that can produce short- and medium-term consequences for
local populations including the propensity or frequency of protest. Changes in
precipitation can lead to drought and flooding, which has an impact on the economy of
the effected region (Burke et al 2009). If the economic impact is great enough, this may
lead people in the region to protest as a method to petition the government to redress their
economic woes.
Factors related to quality of life may also influence protest. Economic indicators
of quality of life such as the employment rate or income per capita are important
predictors of unrest broadly (Alexander 2010; Buhaug 2011; Regan and Norton 2005).
Likewise, prior research finds that the infant mortality rate and the literacy rate are
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important proxies for quality of life (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone 2010).
This analysis extends previous work by testing the influence of quality of life indicators
on protest.
Ethnic and religious fragmentation may also be important drivers of unrest (Beck
2000; Cederman et al. 2011; Gubler 2012). Previous work finds that religious and ethnic
divisions are an important driver of unrest broadly speaking. In the case of India in
particular, religious fragmentation may be a particularly important driver of unrest
(Kumar 2020; Olson and Li 2015). This analysis extends prior research by testing the
relationship between ethno-religious fragmentation and protest.
Social scientists have used varying definitions of protest (Tarrow 1993; Tilly
1981; Opp 2000). For the purpose of this study protest is defined in terms of collective
action events directed at the government or its officials (Tarrow 1993). First, India has
experienced several waves of protests over the last decade (Chaudhuri and Fitzgerald
2015; Kumar and Abi-Habib 2020; Nayak 2010; Raj and Abi-Habib 2019). Possible
explanations include the current nationalist government, shifting demographics, and
rising inequality (Kumar and Abi-Habib 2020; Raj and Abi-Habib 2019). Some detailed
case studies suggest that growing nationalism and shifting gender politics contribute to
mounting unrest (Chaudhuri and Fitzgerald 2015; Nayak 2010).
Second, India represents an opportunity to study a comparatively young
democracy as it moves through a politically volatile period (Chaudhuri and Fitzgerald
2015; Kumar and Abi-Habib 2020; Nayak 2010; Raj and Abi-Habib 2019). As such, it
builds on extant literature regarding determinants of non-violent protest (which
frequently focus on established democracies) as well literature on determinants of violent
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unrest (which frequently focus on failed states and rare events (riots, coups, revolutions)
(e.g. Buhaug et al 2011; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Moreover, as one
of the world’s most populous nations and a major regional power aspiring to global
ascendancy, patterns observed in India might lend themselves to extrapolation (Perkovich
2003; United Nations 2019).
Third, India is demographically and climatologically diverse. Climatologically,
India has arid deserts to the west, a temperate region to the north, and tropical conditions
to the south east (Kumar et al. 2011). India is also demographically diverse, with a wide
variety of religious and ethnic groups (Aiyar and Tillin 2020). This combination of
factors makes India an ideal case study to examine protest outside of the industrialized
countries that typically provide the focus for social scientific analysis.
The social sciences have sought to develop and evaluate general models of
phenomena thought to be related to protest, like riots, revolutions, and other forms of
social unrest with moderate success (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone et al.
2010). One set of characteristics these social science models tend to share, however, is
that they tend to focus on the social, political, and structural determinants of protests
(Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). This study will evaluate the impact of climate trends in
precipitation on the frequency of protests. The purpose of this study is to examine the
relationship between climate (specifically deviation from historical precipitation) and the
frequency of protests at the district level in India in 2016, the most recent year for which
data are available. Using protest data paired with social, cultural, economic, and
demographic indicators drawn from nationally representative sources, this study will
advance understanding of the relationship between protests and precipitation.
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Social scientists have long studied the social determinants of protest as well as the
consequences of disasters on various forms of social instability. However, the extent to
which climatological conditions (especially precipitation) shape social unrest net of social
conditions has yet to be clearly articulated. This study is a step towards explaining the
relationship between extreme precipitation-related conditions and unrest.

Literature Review
Theories of Social Unrest
Social unrest is broadly defined in terms of a collection of forms of unrest
including protests, strikes, and clashes with police, as well as more radical forms
including revolution or civil war (Tilly 1981; also see e.g., Goldstone 2010; Gurr 1970;
McCarthy and Zald 1977; Skocpol 1994; Tarrow 1993; Tarrow 1994). Previous work has
tended to focus on how and why governments go through dramatic change, whether that
be through revolution, civil war, or nonviolent collective action (Cederman, Weidmann,
and Gleditsch 2011; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Gubler and Selway 2012; Keddie
1995; Lindvall 2013; Regan and Norton 2005; Tilly 1978). Examining the determinants
of major historical events such as revolutions, coups, or civil wars is important as it
enables researchers to include countries beyond the U.S. and thus helps rectify a potential
weakness of social movements’ literature. Despite the difficulties associated with the
study of rare events like revolutions, efforts to pinpoint general principles and forces that
generate social unrest continue to improve, as do efforts to test whether scientists can
extrapolate to make predictions about other forms of social unrest such as political
protests (Chenoweth and Belgioioso 2019; Goldstone 2019).
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The Focal Form of Social Unrest: Protest Events
The key form of social unrest in this analysis is protest. Protest is defined in terms
of collective action events directed at the government or its officials (Tarrow 1993).
Sociologists and political scientists tend to focus on protests aimed at the state rather than
(e.g.) those aimed at corporations or other private entities because researchers often study
protest within the context of a wider political or social movement (e.g. Tarrow 1993;
Tilly 1981). Oop (2000) differentiates individual protest from collective protest.
Collective protest is defined as collective action such as demonstrations or traffic
blockades that is predicated on coordination among many individuals, and individual
protests as protest that requires little collective coordination. Protests are easier to study
than revolutions, riots, or other forms of social unrest because protests are relatively
common in comparison, and yet may be intrinsically related to the larger historical
undercurrent of social unrest (Opp 2000). Consequently, there are more observations
along which to compare variation in precipitation. This paper extends the current
literature by examining protest events as a measure of unrest, rather than social unrest
more broadly defined.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Antecedents of Unrest
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The Role of Environmental Conditions in Shaping Protests
The idea that the climate can affect the politics of a nation can be found as early
as the enlightenment era political philosophy of Montesquieu. In The Spirit of the Laws,
Montesquieu speculates that certain differences between the German and Spanish legal
system can be attributed to differences in climate (Davis and Evans, 1777). Montesquieu
originally speculated that people become more suspicious of authority in warm climates,
people are generally more volatile in warmer climates, and consequently the law reflects
the volatility of the people by becoming more restrictive.
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While Montesquieu’s proposition (as well as their ecological fallacy and potential
for spuriousness) have been challenged widely, meta-analysis seems to confirm a positive
causal association between temperatures and unrest (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013).
After reviewing 60 primary studies of both precipitation and temperature, Hsiang and
colleagues standardized temperature and precipitation “whenever possible” and found
that deviation from mean temperature and precipitation are associated with an increase in
the risk of unrest. Hsiang and colleges additionally find that the relationship between
temperature and precipitation is best specified with a nonlinear term. They conclude that
there is greater consensus that a relationship between climate and social unrest exists than
others have suggested (Scheffran et al. 2012).
Changes in the climate may have contributed to the collapse of several ancient
civilizations. Manning and colleagues (2017) find that a volcanic eruption suppressed
flooding along the Nile river which in turn suppressed crop production and led to a series
of revolts in Ptolemaic Egypt (circa 305-30 BCE). One study of China attributes dynastic
change to climatologically cold periods and lower crop production (Zhang et al. 2005).
Another study contends that the collapse of the Akkadian empire to a sudden shift of the
region to a more arid climate (Cullen et al. 2000). A recent article from Kaniewski et al.
(2020) detailed a study of the eastern Mediterranean region spanning 6000 years, finding
that major social changes tend to occur during cooler periods. Understanding the way
climate has influenced civilization historically can bring clarity to the forces that drive
contemporary events.
More recently, climate may have contributed to the conflict in Syria and research
indicates that ongoing conflict in Africa is a consequence of climate change (Hendrix and
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Salehyan 2012; Kelly 2015; Raleigh and Kniveton 2012; Uexkull, d’Errico, and Jackson
2020; O’Loughlin et al. 2012; Meier, Bond, and Bond 2007). Critics argue that there is
not sufficient evidence that the relationship between climate and unrest exist (Buhaug
2010; Buhaug 2015; Selby 2016). However, other research has implicated the economic
impact of climate change and growing climate volatility as a driver of unrest (e.g. Burke,
Marshall, and Hsiang 2015). A clear understanding of the mechanisms that explain the
relationship between climate and protests are needed to properly evaluate models of
protest.
One common hypothesis is that climatological conditions lead to food scarcity,
and in turn political unrest (Jones, Mattiacci, and Braumoeller 2017). Recent research has
examined the relationship between disruptions in the food supply and political instability
and upheaval in a variety of contexts, from sub-Saharan Africa to the Middle East (Jones,
Mattiacci, and Braumoeller 2017; Weinberg and Bakker 2015). However, efforts to draw
a direct link between environmental instability (not limited to extreme weather) and
shocks to the food production system has produced inconsistent results (Burke et al.
2009; Yeeles 2015; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012; Buhaug et al. 2015; Dian et al. 2005;
Manning 2017; Scheffran et al. 2012; Van Loon et al. 2016) with some researchers
finding robust relationships between temperature, rainfall, and social unrest (e.g. Jones,
Mattiacci, and Braumoeller 2017), and others finding weak or null results (Buhaug et al.
2015). These inconsistent results may reflect that many of the country-level or
geographically based socioeconomic indicators typically used as controls are themselves
patterned by environmental forces and thus might confound the empirical relationship
between environmental stressors and unrest patterns. Additionally, previous research has
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focused on long term temperature changes in the climate or drought, however few studies
have considered very wet conditions or flooding as another potential source of unrest
(Buhaug et al. 2015; Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015; Dian et al. 2005; Hsiang, Burke,
and Miguel 2013; Van Loon et al. 2016). This study extends the current literature by
examining very wet conditions, typical of the annual monsoon season in parts of India
(Kumar et al. 2011).
Climatologists have long used historically standardized rainfall to study drought
(Guttman 1999; Hayes et al. 1999; McKee, Doesken, and Kleist 1993). This measure is
generally referred to as the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) (Guttman 1999;
McKee et al. 1993). The Standardized Precipitation Index is now widely accepted as a
standard measure of precipitation in terms of the historical mean for a given region (see
for instance Hayes et al. 1999; Van Loon et al. 2016).

The Role of Inequalities and Quality of Life in Shaping Protests
The contemporary theory of relative deprivation originates with Gurr’s book Why
men rebel. According to relative deprivation theory, people engage in collective action
when there is a gap between what they believe they are entitled to from society and what
they actually have. When perceived entitlements lag behind actual benefits, this is called
a grievance, and Gurr notes that these grievances are not evenly distributed throughout
society – rather they are concentrated within certain social groups. Members of these
groups tend to compare themselves to their place society at large in order to determine
their perceived entitlements and their grievances. When members of a particular group
recognize that inequitable conditions relative to other groups, these grievances leads to
greater social unrest (Gurr 1970). Therefore, relative deprivation theory predicts that
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inter-group inequality will drive social unrest, including protest. This analysis extends the
current literature by examining inequalities as they pertain specifically to protests.
Economic factors, particularly economic inequality give rise to both violent and
nonviolent social movements, particularly when standards of living are compromised by
economic turmoil (Beck 2000; Buhaug et al. 2011; Cederman et al. 2011; Muller and
Seligson 1987; Opp 2000; Regan and Norton 2005). At the district level of analysis,
variation in income per capita may capture economic inequality between districts and
may contribute to protest as a consequence. However, as a democracy India may
conversely experience higher rates of protest in places with a higher per capita income,
because economic growth and democratic participation such as protest may be mutually
reinforcing (Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart 2002). Variation in the employment rate
may also contribute to protest, not only because of the social inequality associated with
employment (or conversely unemployment), but because when employment is low the
unemployed have the time to engage in social unrest (Kelley et al. 2015; Leenders, 2012).
Population, urbanicity, and infant mortality are important demographic indicators
of unrest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone et al. 2010). Chenoweth and Ulfelder
(2017) found that a model containing population on its own is nearly as powerful a
predictor of social unrest as more complex models of unrest, with protests tending to
occur in more populous places. In general urban populations tend to experience more
unrest than rural areas (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). Infant mortality is another
commonly used demographic indicator of unrest, and previous research finds that infant
mortality increases so will social unrest (Goldstone et al. 2010). This paper will test
whether this finding can be extended to protest events. Finally, the literacy rate is found
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to have a positive association with social unrest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). This
paper will test whether or not the literacy rate has the same positive association with
protests as it has with social unrest broadly.

The Role of Ethno-Religious Fragmentation In Shaping Protest
Durkheim (1912) theorized that shared religious identity and belief serve a
fundamental role in the establishment of group identity. For Durkheim shared religious
symbolism generates social conformity and shared identity though a communal system of
belief and ritualistic practice, and religious conflict tends to occur when religions meet.
Modern scholars theorize that contact between people of differing religious identity can
sometimes generate inter-religious competition and at other times inter-religious trust
(Borgonovi 2008; Olson and Li 2015). In the case of nations (like India) were a large
percentage of the population are religious, wherever there is greater religious
heterogeneity (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) discussed at
greater length below) there is far less trust for members of other religions, which may in
turn contribute to an increase in protests (Olson and Li 2015). India is a great case study
because the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) controls the Indian parliament
(Aiyar and Tillin 2020). It may be that BJP control is a symptom of inter-religious
conflict.
A similar vein of research focuses on racial or ethnic group threats (Cederman et
al. 2011; Leenders 2012) or racial divides (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996) as
determinants of social unrest. In general, salient group identities whether religious,
ethnic, or racial may demarcate social inequalities that generate social unrest. India is a
great case study because of its ethnic and religious diversity. India was historically
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organized into a stratified caste system which defined rigid social roles for individuals
based on the caste that they are born into, and some castes face active discrimination.
India also has a number of native tribal populations that are historically disadvantaged
(Chanana 1993). Although the caste system has been outlawed in India individuals who
may otherwise be discriminated against based on these historical inequalities still have a
protected status through The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act of 1989. Protests may therefore be more frequent in places where
historically disadvantaged caste and tribal populations are concentrated because there is
greater potential for intergroup contact.

Hypotheses
Climate and Precipitation
H1: Consecutive years of unusual precipitation have a compounding impact on protests
examined here in terms of its additive properties.
H2: Deviation from the mean precipitation (SPI) will increase the frequency of protests
events (examined here at the district level of analysis over one year).
H2a: Deviation from the mean precipitation (SPI) will increase the frequency of protests
linearly.
H2b: Deviation from mean precipitation (SPI) will have a curvilinear relationship with
the frequency of protests.
Quality Of Life
H3: Districts with a low employment rate will be associated with an increase in the
frequency of protest events.
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H4: Districts with relatively higher income per capita will have a correspondingly greater
frequency of protest events.
H5: The literacy rate at the district level will be positively associated with protests.
H6: The infant mortality rate will be positively associated with protests.
Ethno-Religious Fragmentation
H7: More religiously heterogeneous districts will be associated with a relatively greater
frequency of protests.
H8: Seats held by the BJP will have a positive association with protests.
H9: Percent population in a scheduled caste will have a positive association with protests.
H10: Percent population in a scheduled tribe will have a positive association with
protests.

Data Sources
The 640 districts in India are the unit of analysis for this examination of the focal
relationship between precipitation and protest events. As a unit of analysis, districts are
somewhat analogous to counties in the United States. Two variables – income per capita
and seats held by the BJP party – are measured at the state or union territory level (n=35).
States of India are an administrative boundary larger than districts with their own
government while union territories are administered by the federal government. In the
case of per capita income, data is not available below the state level. Consequently, the
assumption that the districts in each state are independent observations for these two
variables is violated, which may lead to some biased inferences in the analysis (Gelman
2006).
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The rest of this section will describe each data source. See the “variables” section
for details on the operationalization of variables.
Protest Data: The dependent variable for this study is the frequency of protest at
the district level in 2016, derived from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED) (ACLED 2019). 1 Several organizations manage databases of reports
detailing events such as protests, violent uprising, and intergroup conflict. ACLED data
are collected using secondary sources, including traditional media, reports drafted by
non-government organizations, and in some cases local partners and verified new media
including blogs and social networking platforms, and are hand coded by a team of
researchers (ACLED 2020). Although ACLED relies on traditional media which has
documented bias towards underreporting events that are not newsworthy media coverage
remains the best way to measure the occurrence of particular protest events (Demarest
and Langer 2019; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver and Maney
2000; Smith et al. 2001). A detailed description of the operationalization and
interpretation of the protest variable derived from ACLED is outlined below.
Data on Climate Conditions: The primary independent variable was derived
from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station (CHIRPS) data, a
longitudinal data set generated using a combination of satellite and weather station data
(Funk et al. 2015). CHIRPS data calibrates satellite-based precipitation data using global

1

In addition to ACLED, two other databases were evaluated for use in this study; the Integrated Crisis
Early Warning System (ICEWS) (Boschee et al. 2015) and the Global Data on Events Location and Tone
(GDELT) (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013) database. These three data sources rely heavily on news or other
media sources to detect protest events. GDELT and ICEWS use machine learning algorithms to
automatically code news articles to detect reports of protest events, but they may over count events or
include redundant entries (Demarest and Langer 2019; Wang et al. 2016). Based on these data quality
considerations, this project relies on hand- coded data from ACLED to provide relatively accurate counts of
protest events.
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long term rain gauge data. Precipitation is measured as the total (sum) of rainfall in a
given area, and should be interpreted as a measure of how wet or dry a particular
geographic region is over time. Long term rain gauge and satellite geospatial data are
available for a five-degree latitude/longitude grid, which were aggregated to districts for
the 2011 census of India using geographic information system (GIS) software. Since
2011 Indian district boundaries have changed. In cases where data used political
boundaries more recent than 2011, districts were matched to the corresponding 2011
location by hand. In some cases, missing values were introduced because certain districts
could not be meaningfully matched. A detailed description of the way this study
operationalizes the precipitation variable and data limitations are outlined below.
Demographic Data: Other demographic data come from the 2011 Census of
India (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2011), The India Election
Commission (Indian Election Commission nd), the Million Death Study 2012 (MDS)
(Ram et al. 2013), and the Economic and Statistical Organization of Punjab (2020). Most
demographic data used to gauge social inequalities and quality of life indicators come
from the 2011 Census of India, a decennial census of the Indian population. The Census
of India provides data for all 640 districts in 2011. Data regarding seats held in the BJP
comes from the Indian Election Commission, the supervising body of election results in
India. Values are reported for the most recent election before 2011. Infant mortality data
were collected in partnership with the World Health Organization and the Centre for
Global Health Research and identify various causes of premature death in India. Due to
missing data on protest event frequencies, infant mortality, per capita income, and SPI, 107
districts were excluded from the multivariate analysis. Finally, state-level income per
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capita income estimates come from a report published by the Economic and Statistical
Organization of Punjab. All districts in a given state are assigned the same per capita
income values. Variable descriptions and data limitations are outlined below.

Variables
Protest Events
Protest events come from the ACLED dataset and are recorded as the frequency
of reported protests in a district of India. ACLED defines protest events as nonviolent (at
least with respect to protesters) political action aimed at government, or other groups and
contrary to many definitions of protest, ACLED includes businesses, or institutions (e.g.
Tarrow 1993). Protests include peaceful protests, protests with police intervention, and
protests with police intervention that result in protester injuries. Riots and other forms of
violent political decent are coded separately by ACLED and are excluded from this
analysis. Protests often involve unorganized action by members of society, and so the
definition is more expansive that Opp’s (2000) concept of a collective protest. Protest
events are originally collected as individual observations and associated latitude
longitude values. For the purposes of this analysis, protest event data was aggregated
from the latitude/longitude level to the district level, and should be interpreted as a count
or frequency. The average district had 16.01 protests in 2016, but the distribution is
highly skewed (SD = 48.928), with a minimum of 0 protests and a maximum of 597
protests in the capital district of Deli that year. In multivariate analyses, changes in
protest levels should be interpreted as changes in the frequency of protest events for a
given district.
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Climatological Measures
The key climatological measure in this analysis is precipitation. In particular, this
paper focuses on extreme or unusual climate over the course of a year, defined in terms
of the deviation of precipitation in a particular time and place from the historical average
for the place in question. This standardized precipitation measure is often referred to as
the Standardized Precipitation index (SPI) (Guttman 1999, Hayes et al. 1999). In
multivariate regression analyses, coefficients for the SPI should be interpreted as the
effect of the deviation in precipitation for the given year from the historical average on
protests.
In order to test hypothesis H1, the association of SPI and protest is evaluated for
multiple years of SPI from 2010 to 2016 simultaneously. In order to test hypothesis H2b
nonlinear terms are included for each year of SPI. Not only do Hsaing and colleagues
(2013) find support for this representation in their meta-analysis, the nonlinear
representation of SPI is theoretically justified. 2 Relatively dry districts have SPI values
lower than zero while relatively wetter districts have SPI values greater than zero.
Therefore a nonlinear term is needed in order to allow the frequency of protests to
increase in either the positive or negative direction.
Precipitation data for the year 2016 are used in this analysis, the same year for
which ACLED data on protests are available. Although CHIRPS provides raw
precipitation data, raw precipitation does not provide any information about how unusual
the precipitation is for a given region relative to the historical average. To address this,
Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) values were obtained for each district and for each

2

Nonlinearities are commonly found in the study of social unrest, and quadratic or cubic terms for some of
the socio-demographic terms may be appropriate in this analysis as well. Socio-demographic nonlinearities
are not included for the sake of parsimony. This analysis is focused on precipitation.
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year from 2010 to 2016, using the thirty years prior to standardize the measure. 3 SPI
values are a continuous measure of deviation from the historical mean in standardized
units. The further the absolute value of the SPI measure is from zero, the further the
district deviates from the historical mean in 2016. For example, SPI values in 2016 range
from -2.9 to 2.2 standard deviations from the historical average for the district. The mean
of 0.3 indicates that the average district was slightly wetter than is typical for the past 30
years.
Social Inequality and Quality of Life Indicators
Multivariate analyses include four distinct quality of life measures, some of which
also gauge social inequalities. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1: Data for the
employment rate come from the 2011 Census of India. The employment rate is measured
as the population employed divided by the total population. The mean district has an
employment rate of around 40%.
Per capita income measures the income of the average person. It is estimated at
the state and union territory level (N = 35) reported in 1,000 Rupees units. While the
poorest state averages only 20.7 thousand rupees per person, the wealthiest averages
168.6 thousand rupees per person.
The census also includes the literacy rate, measured as the literate population over
the total population. In the average district, approximately 62% of the inhabitance are
literate, and district level literacy rates range from approximately 29% literate to 89%.
Infant mortality rates are generally linked to social inequality and (lack of) quality
of life. Infant mortality rates are measured as the proportion of deaths for infants between

3

Special thanks to Michael Hayes and Beichen Zang for providing SPI data derived from CHIRPS.
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0 and 28 days old and were collected for 2012. The Million Death Study estimates that
an average district has an infant mortality rate for infants between zero and thirty two
months old at approximately 30%. However, the infant mortality rate ranges by district
from only 0.4% to 6.5% indicating a substantial degree of inequality with respect to
infant mortality.
Group Threat and Ethno-Religious Fragmentation Indicators
The percentage of the full population who are members of each religious group is
to gauge the religious diversity of India. The average district is overwhelmingly Hindu,
with 77.8% of the population reporting that they belong to the Hindu faith during the
2011 census. The largest religious minority group is Muslim, and the average district is
13.3% Muslim, followed by Christian (2.9%), Sikh (2.7%), Buddhist (1.2%), and Jain
(0.3%). The minimum of each value is relatively low, and with the exception of the Jain,
the maximum is relatively high.4
However, rather than using proportional representation, this study employs
measure of religious group mixing: religious heterogeneity is operationalized as minus
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (Borgonovi 2008). The HHI is a measure of
concentration among discrete components, and is calculated as the sum of squared
proportions or alternative representation with the formula ∑ (𝑥 ) where xi is the
proportion of persons in a given category and k is the number of categories (Hirschman
1964). Although originally developed in econometrics the HHI is sometimes used by
scholars of religion as a measure of religious homogeneity (Borgonovi 2008). Lower
values on the HHI as less homogeneous and higher values as more homogeneous. To
4

The proportion of persons practicing each religion is included in the summary statistics. However, only
the religious heterogeneity construct is used in the regression models reported below. Models that include
religious percentages were estimated and are available upon request.
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obtain the opposite interpretation this paper follows the example laid out by Olson and Li
(2015) and take one minus the HHI as a measure of religious heterogeneity so that lower
values represent religiously homogeneous districts while high values represent religiously
heterogeneous districts. The score is standardized for the purposes of this analysis in
order to make the model coefficient more easily interpretable.
To gauge ethnic fragmentation, particularly as it relates to inequality and
stratification, a measure of the percent population in a scheduled caste and percent
population in a scheduled tribe are included. In 1989 the Parliament of India enacted the
Scheduled Caste and Tribes Act which made it illegal to discriminate against members of
historically disadvantaged tribes and castes. Members of scheduled castes and tribes are
therefore likely targets of overt as well as systemic discrimination. Members of these
“scheduled castes” and “scheduled tribes” are tabulated in the 2011 Census of India and
presented here as the percent of the population in a caste or tribe out of the total
population in a district. The mean district is made up of 13.6 percent scheduled tribe and
16.1 percent scheduled caste.
The other state-level indicator of political climate in the state is the percent of
seats held by the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in each state.
Seats held by the BJP may represent the hold the Hindu nationalist movement has in a
given state of India. The BJP controls 25.1% of the seats in the average state legislature.
The BJP has the least influence in at least one state with 0% BJP controlled seats, and the
most influence in a state with 64.3% BJP controlled seats.
Control Variables
It is well known that urbanicity is strongly linked to unrest events and so
urbanicity is controlled for in the models below (Chenoweth & Ulfelder 2017).
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Urbanicity is measured as the urban population (as defined by the census) over the total
population for a given district, and ranges from 0% (entirely rural) to 100% (entirely
urban). Total population is the total number of people residing in each district divided by
one thousand and is included as an exposure term. The population of the mean district
was only 24.7% urban, or conversely 75.3% rural. Although the average district had a
population of 2001.09 thousand people, the range is fairly wide; the most populous
district holds approximately 11,060,150 people, while the smallest district contains only
21,170 people.
Data and Variable Limitations
The data sources and variables used in this analysis have limitations. Protest data
drawn from ACLED is based on media-reported events, which causes the under-count of
some newsworthy events (Demarest & Langer 2019; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith
1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver and Maney 2000; Smith et al. 2001). Additionally, although
most of the data are drawn from the Census of India there may still be some nonresponse
bias (Olson 2006). Infant mortality and per capita income data were collected using a
probability sample and may contain any of the bias associated with survey research.
Finally, although every variable except SPI 2016 and its squared term are measured
temporally prior to the frequency of protest events, time order is not sufficient on its own
to establish causality. Any causal interpretation of these results should therefore be
treated with caution.
After missing data were accounted for via list-wise deletion, 533 districts remain
in the analysis.5 Summary statistics after list-wise deletion are relatively close in

5

606 observations are available for protest event frequencies, 574 for infant mortality, 636 for per capita
income, and 633 districts are available for each year of SPI. 640 observations for all other variables.
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magnitude compared to the same set of summary statistics before list-wise deletion. Ttests were used to evaluate differences in means between the analytic sample and the full
sample as well as the observations for which data are missing only. There are significant
(α < 0.05) differences in the means of scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, as well as percent
Hindu and percent Christian, although there was no significant difference for religious
heterogeneity. Districts after list-wise deletion were also compared to observations for
which values are missing with significant (α < 0.05) differences in the means for SPI for
the years 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2014, as well as percent seats held by the BJP,
population, religious heterogeneity, percent population Hindu, percent population
Christian, percent population in a scheduled caste, percent population in a scheduled
tribe, and the employment rate.
Although it is often hypothesized that climate conditions drive food scarcity,
which in turn drives social unrest broadly, food data are not included in this analysis.
However, other demographic indicators like infant mortality may be collinear with food
insecurity, potentially serving as a proxy. Moreover, findings with respect to the food
scarcity hypothesis have been inconsistent potentially indicating that alternative
mechanisms like infant mortality or economic measures such as per capita income and
the employment rate should be considered.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Districts of India
Variable (Unit)

Source

Mean

SD

Min

Max

Unrest Indicators
Protests 2016 (Frequency)

ACLED

16.0

48.9

0

597

Climate Indicators
SPI 2010 (Standard Deviation)
SPI 2011 (Standard Deviation)
SPI 2012 (Standard Deviation)
SPI 2013 (Standard Deviation)
SPI 2014 (Standard Deviation)
SPI 2015 (Standard Deviation)
SPI 2016 (Standard Deviation)

CHIRPS
CHIRPS
CHIRPS
CHIRPS
CHIRPS
CHIRPS
CHIRPS

0.7
0.6
0.3
0.8
-0.1
-0.1
0.3

1.2
0.8
0.7
0.9
0.7
0.9
1.1

-2.2
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-2.2
-2.2
-2.9

2.8
2.2
1.8
2.7
2.8
2.5
2.3

Census
ESOP

40.7
49.1

6.88
23.6

25.8
20.7

66.9
169

Census
MDS

62.0
3.0

10.3
1.1

28.8
0.4

88.7
6.5

Ethno-Religious Fragmentation Indicators
Population Hindu 2011 (%)
Population Muslim 2011 (%)
Population Christian 2011 (%)
Population Sikh 2011 (%)
Population Buddhist 2011 (%)
Population Jain 2011 (%)
Religious Heterogeneity 2011 (SD)
State Seats Held by the BJP 2011 (%)
Population Protected Caste 2011 (%)
Population Protected Tribe 2011 (%)

Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
Census
IEC
Census
Census

77.8
13.3
2.9
2.7
1.2
0.3
0
25.1
16.1
13.6

22.3
17.3
8.2
12.0
6.0
0.6
1
22.2
8.7
21.3

1.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0

99.2
98.5
74.5
93.3
69.9
5.4
4.0
64.3
50.2
98.6

Control Variables
Population Urban 2011 (%)
Total Population 2011 (10000 Persons)

Census
Census

24.7
200

19.0
153

0.0
2

100
1106

Quality of Life Indicators
Total Population Employed 2011 (%)
State Income Per Capita 2011 (1000
Rupees)
Total Population Literacy 2011 (%)
Infant (0-28 days old) Mortality
2012 (%)

ESOP = Economic and Statistical Organization of Punjab; MDS = Million Death Study; IEC = Indian
Election Commission.
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Methods
Negative binomial regression models are used in order to evaluate the relationship
between historically aberrant precipitation and the frequency of protest events. Either a
Poisson regression or a negative binomial regression is the appropriate modeling
technique for a frequency dependent variable that follows a Poisson distribution, or if the
event is relatively rare. The need for Zero-inflated models is tested, finding they preform
nearly identically to models without zero inflation. Testing whether or not relaxing the
dispersion assumption is warranted, findings indicate that the null hypothesis of no over
dispersion is rejected with p < 0.001, indicating that the negative binomial model should
be used. In addition to the negative binomial regression model, a linear regression model
is estimated (though not reported) as a robustness check. Linear regression results are
largely consistent in terms of direction and magnitude with the results presented here.
An exposure term is used to transform the outcome variable to a rate. In an
exposure, the natural log of the variable is taken, and the coefficient is held constant at 1.
In the case of each model presented below, population is the exposure term. Therefore the
outcome is interpreted as a rate of protests over population.
To test for possible collinearity issues, Pearson’s correlations were calculated, and
are reported in Appendix One. The largest coefficient is between percent Hindu and the
religious heterogeneity construct. Consequently, each model tested in Table 2 below
includes only religious heterogeneity and none of the percent of religion from which the
religious heterogeneity construct is derived.
First, a model of protest count regressed on only the control variable urbanicity
and the population exposure term is estimated. Urbanicity is a significant predictor of
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unrest (P<0.001) and has an incident rate ratio of 1.03 (CI = 1.02, 1.04), an AIC of 3571
and a BIC of 3584. Next, in order to evaluate the social and demographic parameters as
well as urbanicity is estimated. Then, in order to evaluate the linear association of SPI
with protests, a model is estimated with linear terms for each year of SPI considered as
well as urbanicity. In order to evaluate the curvilinear association of SPI with protests.
Finally, a full model with all of the variables is estimated.

Results of the Multivariate Analysis
Negative binomial regression results are reported in table two below. Coefficients
are reported as incident rate ratios, meaning that a unit change in any single independent
variable should be interpreted as multiplicative change in the number of protest events
per thousand persons. IRRs values less than one indicate relative decrease in the outcome
per unit change whereas coefficient values greater than one indicate a relative increase in
the outcome per unit change. Lower and upper confidence levels are also provided in
parentheses, and significant terms at an alpha less than 0.05 are marked in boldface rather
than with more traditional asterisks as a space saving measure.
Hypothesis H1 was that consecutive years of SPI have a compounding impact on
the frequency of protest events. Results largely support this hypothesis. In the linear
model, curvilinear and full model multiple years have their own independent effect on the
frequency of protest events per unit population. Since multiple independent years are
significant, they sum together to have a total effect on the frequency of protests per unit
population. However, whether or not cumulative effects across consecutive similar years
– for example two consecutive dry years or two consecutive wet years – cannot be clearly
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determined from these results since the consecutive similarity of years is not modeled
here. The consecutive similarity hypothesis could be tested with an alternate model using
a measure of the difference between any two consecutive SPI values.
Hypothesis H2 states that deviation from the mean will increase the likelihood of
protests. Hypothesis H2a is that H2 holds linearly, and H2a is that H2 holds when
nonlinear terms are introduced. Both claims are largely supported. Linear deviation of
precipitation from the mean is significant for the years 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015,
though not for 2011 and 2016. When nonlinear terms are added to the model, they are
significant for 2010, 2011, 2014, and 2016.
One unusual result is that the direction of linear terms for SPI is not constant. In
the linear only model SPI 2013 and 2016 are negatively related to protests, indicating that
when the year is relatively dry, it also has more protests, and vis-versa when wet.
However, the opposite conclusion should be drawn for every other year – protests
increase when it is relatively wet, and decrease when they are relatively dry.
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Table 2: The Effects of Precipitation, Quality of Life, and Ethno-Religious
Fragmentation on the Frequency of Protests Per Unit Population
Negative Binomial Regression Results: IRR(Lower Confidence Level, Upper Confidence
Level)
Model 1

Model 2

Climate Indicators
SPI 2010
SPI 2011
SPI 2012
SPI 2013
SPI 2014
SPI 2015
SPI 2016
Climate Indicators Squared
SPI 20102
SPI 20112
SPI 20122
SPI 20132
SPI 20142
SPI 20152
SPI 20162
Quality of Life Indicators
Employment
0.95(0.93,0.98)
Rate
Income Per1.02(1.01,1.03)
Capita
Literacy Rate
1.00(1.00,1.02)
Infant Mortality
0.97(0.95,0.98)
Ethno-Religious Fragmentation Indicators
Religious
0.83(0.70,0.98)
Heterogeneity
Seats Held by
0.99(0.98,1.00)
the BJP
Population
1.00(0.98,1.01)
Protected Caste
Population
1.00(0.99,1.02)
Protected Tribe
Control Variables
Urbanicity
1.03(1.02,1.04) 1.02(1.01,1.03)
AIC
3571
3514
BIC
3584
3561

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

1.17(1.05,1.31)
1.11(0.94,1.33)
1.83(1.52,2.20)
0.71(0.58,0.87)
2.18(1.83,2.60)
1.64(1.42,1.91)
0.88(0.76,1.04)

1.02(0.89,1.16)
0.92(0.73,1.16)
1.57(1.27,1.94)
0.14(0.53,1.09)
2.39(1.90,3.02)
0.96(1.20,1.68)
0.85(0.74,0.99)

0.92(0.78,1.08)
0.73(0.58,0.93)
1.60(1.27,2.03)
0.75(0.80,1.12)
2.34(1.85,2.96)
1.46(1.23,1.73)
0.93(0.79,1.09)

1.13(1.1,1.25)
1.54(1.30,1.84)
1.03(0.83,1.28)
0.95(0.80,1.12)
1.25(1.05,1.47)
0.96(0.84,1.09)
0.88(0.81,0.96)

1.16(1.04,1.30)
1.64(1.37,1.96)
0.96(0.77,1.20)
0.95(0.80,1.12)
1.35(1.13,1.62)
0.93(0.82,1.06)
0.91(0.83,0.99)
0.98(0.95,1.00)
1.00(1.00,1.01)
1.03(1.01,1.05)
0.99(0.98,1.01)
0.89(0.77,1.02)
1.00(1.00,1.01)
1.00(0.99,1.03)
1.00(0.99,1.01)

1.04(1.03,1.04)
3272
3315

1.04(1.03,1.04)
3217
3290

1.03(1.02,1.04)
3202
3309

Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are abbreviated. An exposure term for Population
(Thousand Persons) is also included. The sample size is constant across all models. N = 533. Coefficients reported as Incident Rate
Ratios (IRR). Significant terms (α = 0.05) indicated in Boldface.
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Hypothesis H3 predicts a negative association between employment and protests.
This hypothesis is supported by model 2, but falls out in the full model, perhaps
indicating that the relationship is either mediated or moderated by SPI after the
employment rate is measured in 2011.
Hypothesis H4 predicts that income per capita is positively associated with
protests. Again, this is supported by the model 2 and falls out in the model 4.
H5 predicts that the literacy rate is positively associated with protests, and is
supported by the full model. It is unclear why this variable was not supported in the
social only model, but perhaps a suppression effect is indicated. Contrary to expectations,
the literacy rate was not associated with protests in the social only model.
Hypothesis H6 predicts that infant mortality will be positively associated with
protests. This is contradicted by the social only model, which indicates that as the infant
mortality rate rises, the frequency of protests falls. This result may be because the
relationship between infant mortality rates and better specified with a nonlinear term.
Hypothesis H7 predicts that religious heterogeneity will have a positive
association with the frequency of protests. This hypothesis is contradicted by model 2.
This may be because more religiously heterogeneous places are politically
disenfranchised by the current ruling BJP party. Religious heterogeneity falls out in the
full model. This may indicate that the relationship between religious heterogeneity and
protests is either mediated or moderated by precipitation.
As predicted by Hypothesis H8, seats held by the BJP are negatively associated
with protests, likely because these are the places already represented by the ruling
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political party. This term also falls out in the full model, and may also be suppressed by
the presence of SPI terms.
Two closely related hypotheses, H9 and H10 were not supported. H9 predicts that
the percent population in a scheduled caste and the percent population in a scheduled
tribe will each have a positive association with protests. Contrary to expectations, neither
term was significant in either the social only or the full model.
As expected, urbanicity is significant in every estimated model, and is relatively
stable across models both in terms of the IRR and confidence interval. This finding only
reiterates a well-established fact that urbanicity is one of the most important predictors of
unrest available, regardless of the context.
Nonlinear terms allow the frequency of protests to increase in the dry direction
and the wet direction simultaneously. Figure two illustrates the shape of the predicted
curvilinear relationship for every year of SPI included in the analysis. The interpretation
of each line chart below is the same. The marginal predicted frequency of protest events
is calculated for a range of SPI values from -3 to 2.6 and plotted on a line chart. Model 4
(curvilinear SPI and urbanicity only), is indicated with a dashed line while Model 5 (the
full model) is indicated with a solid line.
As in the linear model, the shape of each curved line is not consistent across
years. Curvilinear terms were significant for the years 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016 in
model 4 and years 2011, 2012, 2014, and 2015 in model 5. This result is largely
consistent with hypothesis H2b, which states that SPI will have a curved relationship with
the frequency of protests. However, the direction and shape of the curved lines in
inconsistent across years, and it is therefore somewhat difficult to interpret. Although,
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protests broadly tend to increase as SPI moves away from the mean at zero, 2016 predicts
the greatest frequency of protests near the mean.
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Figure 2: Curvilinearity in the Predicted Rate of Protests over Population
by SPI by Year
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Discussion and Conclusion
Taken together, these results indicate that regional climate change (as gauged by
deviation in precipitation) is likely related to levels of protest at the district level. While
the independent variables are temporally antecedent to the outcome variable (which
suggests a direct causal link), it is important to note that the 5-year time lag between the
climate-related indicators and the protest variable weakens the rationale for making such
a causal argument. For that reason, as well as the fact that the analysis essentially uses
cross-sectional data for both the predictor and the outcome, it is more appropriate to
describe regional climate change as associated with protest levels, in complex ways.
With the exception of 2013 and 2016, unusually wet districts are more likely to
experience higher levels of protest.
Many variables that are significant in the social only model drop out in the full
model. It is entirely possible that this is because precipitation moderates, or, given a
compelling causal argument, mediates the relationship between social indicators and
protest. More advanced modeling techniques such as those found in structural equation
modeling (SEM) methodology may help future researchers to elaborate the set of
underlying mechanisms that explain the relationships in the data. In general, the results
are highly suggestive of the hypothesis that climate moderates the relationship between
protest and social demographic indicators. It is difficult to theoretically justify the idea
that climate mediates the effects of social and demographic variables on unrest, because it
is unclear how social variables like income or infant mortality cause deviation from mean
precipitation. However, it does seem likely that deviation from mean precipitation
changes the degree of the association between social variables and unrest.
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Likewise, results suggest that social inequalities and quality of life indicators are
associated with protest levels. The employment rate, and infant mortality rate were found
to negatively associate with protests, income per capita was positively associated with
protests and while the literacy rate was not significant in the social only model, it became
significant in the full model. These results provide support for the idea that inequalities,
particularly those related to quality of life matter for predicting protest (Alexander 2010;
Buhaug 2011; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone 2010; Regan and Norton 2005).
This analysis extends previous research that focuses primarily on violent conflict to
nonviolent protest events (e.g. Burke et al. 2009; Carleton, Hsang and Burke 2016;
Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 2013; Jones, Mattiacci, and
Braumoeller 2017; Kelley et al. 2015; Meier, Bond, and Bond 2007; Raleigh and
Kniveton 2012).
Results for Ethno-Religious Fragmentation were somewhat less consistent than
quality of life measures. Religious heterogeneity and seats held by the BJP were both
found to be important predictors of a decrease in protest levels, which provides some
limited support for the hypothesis from others that ethnic and racial contact leads to
intergroup conflict and social unrest, as well as the finding that religious heterogeneity
decreases inter-religious trust (Beck 2000; Cederman et al. 2011; Gubler 2012; Olson and
Li 2015). Although the relationship is significant, the direction is contrary to the
hypotheses provided above. The negative direction may be explained by the fact that the
BJP is in power – there is less reason for the majority Hindu population to engage in
protest. The percent scheduled caste and percent scheduled tribe were not significant. It is
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possible that an ethnic heterogeneity measure similar to the religious heterogeneity
measure is more appropriate here.
One limitation of this analysis are indicated by the predicted number of protests
per thousand persons indicated by the model (but not reported). Predicted marginal
frequencies are for these models are much larger than would be expected based on the
observed frequency of protests. These large predicted marginal frequencies are likely a
consequence of some as yet unresolved multicollinearity, which may exaggerate some
model coefficients.
Additionally, climate is not just a matter of precipitation. A temperature measure
might very well improve the climatological side of the model. In this analysis,
precipitation is measured over the course of the entire year. However, more granular
measures of deviations in precipitation (e.g., over the course of a few months rather than
an entire year) might capture the short-term (or long-term) impact of disasters such as
flooding more effectively. Additionally, this analysis is focused on India, and so the
results might not be generalizable to other places.
On one had a merit of this analysis was that it addresses some of the limitations of
previous research. Studies of precipitation are relatively rare, and those that do exist often
only include a single year of data. Moreover, raw precipitation is often used rather than
the standardized precipitation index, and raw precipitation doesn’t account for the
historical unusualness of the precipitation.
However, these results raise new questions that merit future work. First, the
potential influence of climate on other forms of unrest such as riots, civil conflict, or
political revolution merit further consideration. Next, parts of India experience an annual
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monsoon season, which may be an important driver of protest events in India. The
monsoon season may have consequences for property damage as well as the quality of
drinking water (Kumar et al. 2011). Future research can address this by focusing on
measures of SPI during the monsoon season or dry season only, rather than a full year.
Finally, another issue to take up in future work is the potential mediating or moderating
relationships that are indicated by the tendency for socio-demographic indicators to fall
out of the model.
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APPENDIX A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Significant results (α = 0.05) in bold.
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